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Abstract
We investigate whether a departure from a tax-based accounting system toward the adoption
of International Financial Reporting Standards encourages tax noncompliance. We also
examine whether such a departure, which weakens book-tax conformity, affects the
informativeness of book-tax differences for tax noncompliance. Our evidence suggests that
as book-tax conformity decreases, tax noncompliance increases. Although book-tax
differences remain informative of tax noncompliance, the informativeness attenuates as
book-tax conformity weakens. Additionally, firms with high incentives to inflate book
income are more tax compliant than their counterparts after the departure from a tax-based
accounting system.
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1. Introduction
This study investigates the impact of a major change in an accounting system on tax
noncompliance. Specifically, many developed and developing countries use tax-based
accounting systems, but some countries have recently changed their accounting systems to be
more in line with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 1 This move is
claimed to enhance the usefulness of financial reporting and gives corporate managers
considerable discretion over the choice of accounting methods. It also signals a major
departure of financial reporting from tax reporting. Based on the experience in China, we
investigate whether this departure encourages tax noncompliance and whether after the
departure we can still use book-tax differences as a red flag to signal tax noncompliance.
1.1.

Studies on book-tax differences and changes in the book-tax relationship

Book-tax differences can be due to differences between accounting standards and tax laws.
They can also be the result of a firm's tradeoff between the tax incentive to lower taxable
income and the financial reporting incentive to increase book income. Some research
suggests that large book-tax differences are positively associated with aggressive tax reporting
(Desai, 2003; [Mills, 1996] and [Mills, 1998]). Other research indicates that aggressive
financial reporting contributes to large differences (Ayers et al., 2009; Hanlon, 2005; Lev and
Nissim, 2004; Phillips et al., 2003; Seidman, 2008). These studies examine the book-tax
relationship in the US, where there are two separate sets of rules governing book and tax
accounting and where the relationship between these two incomes has been generally stable
over the years.
Studies on the impact of a change in the book-tax relationship have found that increasing
book-tax conformity causes firms to shift income for financial reporting purposes (Dhaliwal
and Wang, 1992; Guenther et al., 1997). However, it is not clear whether we can infer
taxable income shifting from book income shifting (Hanlon, 2005). Hanlon et al. (2008)
find that such an increase in book-tax conformity also reduces the informativeness of earnings
in the US. These studies focus on examining the impact on financial reporting quality of a
change in the tax law that strengthens book-tax conformity.
In this study, we examine whether changes in a financial reporting regime that weaken
book-tax conformity encourage tax noncompliance. We take advantage of a distinct set of
Chinese listed companies that experienced such changes to examine this issue. Before 1998,
the accounting system in China was closely linked to tax assessment. In a tax-based
accounting system where book income and taxable income conform, financial reporting costs
directly mitigate corporate incentives to avoid tax, and tax authorities are likely to treat any
significant shortage of taxable income below book income as tax noncompliance. After
1998, China gradually relaxed the close link between tax and book income by allowing firms
to make entries in their books of accounts that differ from the tax rules. When book income
is detached from taxable income, corporate incentives to engage in tax noncompliance will be
much less constrained by financial reporting costs. Therefore, we hypothesize that as
book-tax conformity decreases, tax noncompliance will increase.
When the two incomes are detached, book-tax differences can arise due to (1) legitimate
differences in accounting standards versus tax rules, (2) managers exercising discretion in
financial reporting to overstate book income and (3) managers taking advantage of the
ambiguity in tax rules to understate taxable income. Because book-tax differences come
1
Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Vietnam and Eastern European countries have been among those with heavy
tax influence on their national accounting systems (e.g., Street, 2002). However, there has been a trend toward a more independent
relationship between accounting and taxation. For example, in line with international practice, Vietnam switched from a tax-based focus to an
accrual-based accounting system in 2002 (Ernst and Young, 2002). Since 2005, France and Germany have adopted IFRS for listed companies
(Radebaugh et al., 2006, 68, 71). More recently, Russia modified its accounting system from being “high alignment” to “low alignment”
(Goncharov and Zimmermann, 2006). China has also gradually moved away from a tax-based accounting system since 1998.
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from a combination of these sources, which are difficult to separate, the use of these
differences to draw inferences about tax aggressiveness could be unreliable (Seidman, 2008;
Tang, 2006). Thus, we hypothesize that as the level of book-tax conformity decreases, the
informativeness of book-tax differences for a firm's tax aggressiveness will decrease.
1.2.

Decomposing tax noncompliance

To provide more insight into the type of noncompliance affected by changes in financial
reporting, we decompose noncompliance into book-tax-conforming noncompliance
(violations of both financial reporting and tax rules) and book-tax-difference noncompliance
(violations of tax rules only). Because the opportunities and incentives for each type of
noncompliance are not homogeneous, this approach offers a better understanding of the
relationship between book-tax differences and tax aggressiveness than an examination of the
aggregate noncompliance alone (Chan and Mo, 2002; Rhoades, 1999). Our study provides
robust archival evidence that legislative changes, which reduce book-tax conformity are likely
to result in less compliance with tax laws. The effect is mainly on book-tax-difference
noncompliance rather than book-tax-conforming noncompliance. Our finding also suggests
that the departure of financial reporting from tax reporting is likely to increase the complexity
of book-tax differences, which in turn will reduce their informativeness for tax
noncompliance. That reduction is most apparent for book-tax-difference noncompliance.
Nevertheless, book-tax differences remain informative of tax noncompliance even after the
departure from tax-based accounting.
1.3.

Contributions of this study

Our study contributes to the line of research that examines book-tax tradeoffs (e.g., Erickson
et al., 2004; Hanlon et al., 2008; Mills, 1998). In particular, Mills (1998) finds a positive
relation between tax audit adjustments and book-tax differences in the US. Our parallel
finding suggests that Mills’ results are not country specific and can be generalized to different
institutional settings. Thus, our study validates the robustness of the book-tax tradeoff
theory in a significant way, as our setting of a departure from a tax-based accounting system is
pertinent to transition economies. Moreover, we extend Mills’ research by examining how
the relationship between tax audit adjustments and book-tax differences alters when
regulatory changes cause a reduction in book-tax conformity. We find a decrease in the
strength of this relationship as book-tax conformity decreases. We also find that book-tax
differences are less informative about tax noncompliance for high book incentive firms (such
as rights offering firms) than their counterparts after the departure from tax-based accounting.
Our research is also timely in light of the recent policy debate in the US on the perceived
costs and benefits of making the two income measures conform. While some studies
suggest that conforming book and tax rules decreases the information content of accounting
information, others argue that in addition to lowering record-keeping costs, book-tax
conformity would mitigate corporate incentives to engage in aggressive tax reporting.
Although there is evidence that this conformity would weaken the information content of
financial reporting (and thus reduce earnings quality) (Hanlon, 2005; Hanlon et al., 2008; Lev
and Nissim, 2004; Phillips et al., 2003), the literature provides no evidence of the effect of
conforming the two incomes on corporate tax noncompliance (Hanlon and Shevlin, 2005).
Shevlin (2002) calls for more research to examine the consequences of book-tax conformity
in those countries that closely align book and taxable income. We provide direct evidence of
the unfavorable tax-compliance consequences of switching the reporting regime from high to
low book-tax conformity in China. The debate in the US focuses on whether book and
taxable incomes should conform more. Indeed, one of the alternatives considered by the
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform is taxing book income (Hanlon et al., 2008;
McClelland and Mills, 2007). We inform this debate by providing evidence of how a change
in book-tax conformity affects corporate tax reporting behavior.
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As many countries are moving away from tax-based accounting systems toward IFRS, our
results serve as a useful reference for them in formulating their accounting and taxation
policies. In particular, these countries should consider increasing their tax enforcement
efforts, including education on taxpayer accountability in anticipation of an increased amount
of tax noncompliance (Sanders et al., 2008). For countries that are not using tax-based
accounting such as the US, if the adoption of IFRS results in less conformity than the current
system (e.g., the removal of the link between book and tax accounting on LIFO as IFRS does
not allow the use of LIFO), then we might similarly predict firms to be less compliant with
the tax law.2 This implication suggests that even those countries that are used to dealing with
nonconforming systems should maintain vigilance and adopt book-tax reconciliation
requirements, similar to Schedule M-3 used in the US for public firms, to disclose more
information on the sources and the magnitude of significant book-tax differences (Boynton
and Mills, 2004).
In the next section, we describe the evolution of the relationship between financial reporting
and taxation in China. We then develop the research hypotheses and describe the research
design in 3 and 4, respectively. We present the primary univariate and multivariate empirical
results in Section 5 and draw our conclusions in Section 6.
2. Institutional background
2.1.

Changes in the level of book-tax conformity in China

The traditional accounting system in China was directly linked to the fiscal budget and tax
assessment. Before 1978, there were no personal or enterprise income taxes, and thus no tax
policy. In 1979, the government introduced the profit-retention system, under which
state-owned enterprises could retain a portion of their profits. In 1983, the government
replaced that system with a tax-remittance system that required all state-owned enterprises to
pay a progressive income tax. In 1994, the government launched a comprehensive tax
reform that required all domestic enterprises to pay income tax at a flat rate of 33%. In
March 2007, China leveled the playing field for domestic and foreign companies by
equalizing the rate to 25%, effective January 1, 2008.
Since the government first implemented the tax system in 1983, tax laws have played a
significant role in firms’ financial reporting activities. The rules for measuring accounting
profits were essentially the same as those for measuring taxable profits. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises that was issued in 1992
lacked many important qualitative characteristics of financial reporting that are typically
found in Western countries (Davidson et al., 1996). Over the years, significant changes in
the socioeconomic environment in China have triggered a diversification in the objectives of
financial reporting. For example, the establishment of foreign investment enterprises has
brought in foreign investors. The privatization of state-owned enterprises has introduced
domestic and foreign shareholders and creditors. Unlike the government, the new users of
financial statements are concerned about whether any bias in financial reporting (e.g., tax
consideration) hinders sound business decisions. For example, before 1998, government
regulations set limits for bad debt provisions, controlled the selection of depreciation methods
and the estimation of the residual value and useful life of fixed assets. These tax-driven
accounting provisions are incapable of truly reflecting a firm's financial position and
operating results. Such problems are especially serious given the relatively few alternative
sources of information that analysts and investors can rely on in China's capital market.
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The US Congress is considering repealing LIFO for tax purposes (Hamilton, 2009). Our prediction that US firms
will become less compliant is based on the assumption that LIFO remains a permissible tax accounting method
in the US, or that the original LIFO firms may choose different methods for tax and financial reporting in the
future.
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Domestic and international pressures have hastened changes in the book-tax relationship in
China. In 1998, the Chinese government implemented a set of detailed operational
accounting standards, Accounting Regulation for Listed Companies, that formally recognized
for the first time that the objectives of financial reporting were different from those of tax
reporting and that there was a need to relax the tax-based accounting principle. The 1998
Regulation permitted greater managerial discretion in financial accounting by removing many
government controls. For example, it removed the rigid limits on firms’ bad debt provisions,
granted firms freedom to determine the useful life of assets and choose depreciation methods
for financial reporting that are different from those under the tax law, and allowed a departure
from historical cost for several asset classes for purposes of financial reporting. With this
increased discretion, Chinese managers had incentives to use different methods for financial
and tax reporting as elaborated later. Thus, the gap between the two forms of reporting
began to widen.
In preparing to meet its World Trade Organization commitment to accelerate the international
accounting harmonization process, the Chinese government revised the Accounting Standards
for Business Enterprises, effective from 2001. The 2001 Standards marked a further
departure from a tax-based accounting system. For example, it no longer considered the
government to be the most important information user (Xiao et al., 2004). The Standards
also expanded the application of the conservatism principle beyond that outlined in the 1998
Regulation. Most significantly, it reinforced a change in the management mindset about
financial and tax reporting, allowing firms to legitimately maintain two sets of books and
determine separate incomes for financial and tax reporting purposes.
2.2.

Book-tax differences before and after the departure

As discussed above, financial reporting in China has evolved through stages since the late
1990s. In comparison, there has been little change in tax legislation since 1994. The move
of financial reporting toward IFRS could lead to more aggressive earnings and tax
management as public firm managers have dual incentives in reporting high book income and
low tax income.
During the book-tax conformity period, Chinese managers were supposed to use the same
accounting methods for book and tax purposes, except for legitimate differences such as
interest income from government bonds, which are not taxable but are recognized as income
on the book. Therefore, managers did not blatantly use different methods for book and tax
reporting to evade taxes. However, while the variety of book-tax differences in the
high-conformity period was much smaller than that in the later periods, some still led to tax
audit adjustments. Misunderstanding of, or grey areas in, the tax law often caused these
cases. One example is government subsidies. To protect the public against rising inflation,
the Chinese government controlled retail prices of many daily necessities, such as gasoline,
utilities and basic foodstuffs. In return, the government paid discretionary subsidies to the
affected companies from time to time to compensate for losses due to the price controls.
Those companies reported these subsidies as book income, which was generally taxable with
many exceptions, depending on the size and nature of the subsidies. As the qualifying
criteria for tax exemption varied from time to time and were often unclear, many managers
deliberately failed to report some subsidies as taxable income when they should have.
Another example is accrued interest, which should be reported as both book and taxable
income. Some managers did not report accrued interest for tax purposes on the grounds that
they had received no cash to pay the tax.
When the book-tax reporting rules diverged after 1998, Chinese managers were in a better
position to plan complicated tax avoidance activities with little effect on financial reporting.
Because the new reporting rule permits flexibility in selecting accounting methods and allows
managers to make book entries that are different from the requirement of the tax rules,
managers could deliberately make an entry in one set of books but not the other, or make
different entries in each set using dissimilar revenue and expense recognition criteria.
5

The Appendix provides examples of common accounting items with book-tax differences
before and after the departure from tax-based accounting. These are legitimate book-tax
differences according to the relevant accounting and tax regulations during our sample period.
However, these accounting items could result in tax audit adjustments if firms violate the
relevant tax regulations.
2.3.

Tax audits and audit adjustments

In China, the calendar year is used for both financial and tax reporting purposes. During our
sample period, Chinese listed companies had to file their annual income tax returns and their
financial statements with the local tax authorities within 45 days from the year end. The tax
return begins with gross revenue, followed by deductible expenses, and then by adjustments
to compute taxable income. In the adjustment section, companies have to disclose book-tax
reconciling items.
Like many other jurisdictions, China's tax system works on self-assessment, which
necessarily requires the tax authorities to carry out post-assessment field audits to verify
compliance. Although the government has pursued tax evaders for years, the focus in the
past appears to have been on foreign companies, and recently on the personal income tax of
wealthy domestic individuals. There has been no similar nationwide campaign targeting
Chinese listed companies, although similar to other businesses of economic significance,
these listed companies are subject to periodic audits. There was no reported change to the
audit procedures or audit rates for listed companies over the study period according to the Tax
Yearbook of China published by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT, 1996–2004).
Although tax auditors’ expertise should improve over time, business and reporting
complexities should also increase, thus leaving audit effectiveness essentially constant across
the years.
Starting in 1995, the Chinese tax authorities began to consider firm characteristics when
identifying the audit sample. For example, firms that report drastic changes in earnings and
low profit margins (relative to the industry average) are more likely to come under scrutiny
(SAT, 1997). Tax auditors usually start the audit by examining the tax returns and book-tax
reconciliation schedules. They frequently focus on transactions that generate large book-tax
differences, and follow up on exceptional variances between the two measures of income in
the field audit. They also pay attention to taxpayers whose tax payable is incompatible with
firm size (SAT, 1997). However, for cases with special complexities, such as transfer pricing
manipulations, tax auditors will transfer these cases to a special audit department. Thus,
similar to [Chan and Mo, 2000] and [Chan and Mo, 2002], this study excludes transfer pricing
adjustments. Tax auditors finish the audit process by preparing a report that details every
individual adjustment, including the type of account involved, the amount of adjustment
proposed, reasons for the adjustment, and the effect of the adjustment on taxable income (SAT,
1995).
We measure tax noncompliance as the magnitude of the tax audit adjustment required by the
tax authorities ( [Chan and Mo, 2000] and [Chan and Mo, 2002]; Chan et al., 2006b; Hanlon
et al., 2007; Mills, 1998). Although taxpayers can in theory appeal the decisions of the
Chinese tax bureaus, few have done so in practice (Chan and Mo, 2002; Chan et al., 2006b).
Following Chan and Mo (2002), we divide tax audit adjustments into book-tax-conforming
adjustments and book-tax-difference adjustments. Book-tax-conforming adjustments refer
to those made to correct misstatements arising from violations of both financial and tax
reporting regulations; they affect both book income and taxable income. Examples include
understating sales revenue and overstating cost of sales. Firms have to increase their book
income for this kind of adjustment (SAT, 1993). Book-tax-difference adjustments relate to
errors or irregularities arising from differences in financial reporting and tax regulations, and
affect taxable income only. Items that frequently require book-tax-difference adjustments
include omitted taxable revenues already reported on the book, claiming expenses that are
6

non-deductible, and claiming expenses exceeding allowable limits.
3. Research hypotheses
Based on the foregoing discussion, we develop two sets of hypotheses about the impact of
changes in book-tax conformity on tax noncompliance.
3.1.

Level of book-tax conformity and tax noncompliance

When accounting and tax regulations were largely aligned in China before 1998, corporate
managers had to report conforming book income in most aspects. This limited the extent to
which firms could reduce taxable income while raising book income. Taxable income
significantly lower than book income readily signals tax noncompliance, making firms less
likely to report significant book-tax differences. If public firm managers lower taxable
income and book income by a similar amount (i.e. book-tax-conforming noncompliance),
they can incur high contracting and capital market costs, as reporting lower levels of book
income has a negative effect on debt covenants and share price. In such circumstances,
managers have to balance the value of the expected tax savings with the associated non-tax
costs.
When the two sets of reporting rules were delinked, partially in 1998 and more completely in
2001 in China, recognition criteria for tax and financial reporting purposes diverged, giving
managers more leeway to lower taxable income in ways that did not necessarily lower book
income in a conforming manner.3 In other words, managers now have more opportunities for
tax noncompliance.
While managers who report conformity to minimize tax costs face non-tax reporting costs,
they no longer face the same costs when they do not have to report conforming book income.
This suggests that regimes that allow the dual reporting of income will be likely to induce
firms to have more book-tax-difference noncompliance, i.e., to take a more aggressive tax
position with little or no effect on book income. For book-tax-conforming noncompliance,
managers will face a tax versus non-tax cost tradeoff similar to what they encountered in the
high book-tax conformity period. Because the incentive for conforming noncompliance has
not changed since the departure from tax-based accounting, we expect no significant change
in this type of noncompliance. Hence, we formulate our first composite hypothesis as
follows.
H1. The magnitude of firms’ tax noncompliance increases as book-tax reporting conformity
decreases. Specifically, the magnitude of book-tax-difference noncompliance in a low
book-tax conformity period is greater than that in a moderate book-tax conformity period,
which in turn is greater than that in a high book-tax conformity period. In contrast, the
magnitude of book-tax-conforming noncompliance does not differ significantly among the
three periods.
Some studies have found that in low book-tax conformity regime such as the US, large
book-tax differences are the result of aggressive financial reporting (Ayers et al., 2009; [Desai
and Dharmapala, 2006] and [Desai and Dharmapala, 2009]; Hanlon, 2005). Thus, it is not
certain that large book-tax differences in the book-tax delinked period will necessarily mean
an increase in tax noncompliance. Whether managers actually behave as hypothesized is the
purpose of our empirical test. As far as we can determine, we are the first to provide such
3

Recent high-profile cases in the US have demonstrated the ability of some large public firms to structure
transactions that reduce the amount of taxes paid, without reporting any corresponding decrease in pretax
book income. For example, Enron was able to report its taxable income over the years 1996–1999 at US$5.8
billion below its financial reporting income (Seida, 2003).
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evidence on corporate tax compliance. It is also possible that after the departure, firms will
have less need to engage in book-tax-conforming noncompliance because they will have more
leeway and lower non-tax costs to engage in book-tax-difference noncompliance. Whether
this is the case is also an empirical question.
3.2.

Informativeness of book-tax differences for tax noncompliance

If the two sets of income measures conform, any unexplained difference between the two
incomes is a potential indicator of tax noncompliance. However, if the two income measures
are detached, allowing firms to report book and taxable incomes separately, then the gap
between the two could become large. The sources of this gap include identifiable
differences due to the specific method required by each regulation, as well as differences due
to managers exploiting nonconforming rules to simultaneously manage book income upward
and taxable income downward. Hence, it can be quite unreliable if tax authorities use
book-tax differences to inform tax evasion in this situation (Seidman, 2008). To summarize,
as book-tax conformity decreases bringing more “noise” into book-tax differences, we expect
these differences to become less indicative of a firm's book-tax-difference noncompliance.
However, as book-tax-conforming noncompliance typically reduces book and taxable
incomes by a similar amount, we expect that a change in book-tax differences will have no
significant impact on this type of noncompliance. Accordingly, we establish our second
composite hypothesis as follows.
H2. The informativeness of book-tax differences for tax noncompliance decreases as
book-tax reporting conformity decreases. Specifically, book-tax-difference noncompliance
is less sensitive to book-tax differences in a low book-tax conformity period than in a
moderate book-tax conformity period, which in turn is less sensitive than in a high book-tax
conformity period. In contrast, book-tax-conforming noncompliance is not sensitive to
book-tax differences in all three periods.
While it is reasonable to expect a decrease in the informativeness of book-tax differences for
tax noncompliance as book-tax conformity decreases, this is by no means certain. Some
firms can become very aggressive in tax reporting when book and tax incomes are delinked.
Thus, their tax noncompliance can account for the major portion of their book-tax differences.
Therefore, whether the informativeness of those differences will decline over time and
whether we can still use those differences to predict tax noncompliance after delinking are
empirical research questions.
4. Research design
4.1.

Sample selection and data

Our sample includes non-financial firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges during 1996–2003. We chose this period to cover the years both before and after
the delinking of financial reporting from tax rules. This is also a period when the 1994 tax
reform (a major reform) was in full effect and during which no additional tax reform took
place. We obtained archival data on firm-level taxable income and tax audit adjustments
from the Chinese tax authorities. Tax officials randomly selected the cases from their annual
tax audit database. Acquiring taxable income from the tax returns minimizes measurement
errors arising from the estimate of taxable income from tax expense and thus increases the
power of our statistical tests (Hanlon, 2003; Mills and Plesko, 2003). We collected the book
income and other financial information about the sample firms from the China Stock Market
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. In China, both the separate and the
consolidated entities use the same set of accounting standards.
We began with 3647 firm-years with both complete audit and financial statement data
available from 1996 through 2003. Consistent with Mills (1998) and as explained in the
8

robustness test section, we excluded 485 firm-years with negative or zero book-tax
differences (13% of the sample). This process screened out 458 firm-years reporting a loss.
We also excluded 172 firm-years with negative or zero audit adjustments (5% of the sample)
to obtain more generalizable results (Mills, 1998). We dealt with these exclusions in our
sensitivity tests reported in the robustness test section. Finally, we trimmed off 49
firm-years identified as outliers with standardized residuals for audit adjustments exceeding
three standard deviations in absolute value. Thus, our pooled, cross-sectional sample for the
main regression consists of 2941 firm-year observations. The majority of the sample firms
operate in the manufacturing industry (53%), followed by wholesale and retail trades (11%),
conglomerates (10%), information technology (6%), real estate (5%) and utilities (4%).
4.2.

Specification of the regression model

To test our hypotheses, we draw on Mills (1998) to develop the following OLS regression
models (firm and time subscripts are suppressed for simplicity)
ADJ= α 0+ α 1BTD+ α 2PARTIAL_DELINK+ α 3DELINK+ α 4BTD × PARTIAL_DELINK+ α 5BTD ×
DELINK+α6RIGHTS+α7BTD×RIGHTS+α8OWNER+α9AGE+α10LOSS+α11SIZE+α12B_SHARE+
α13LEVERAGE+αkINDUSTRY+ε

(1)

BTD_ADJ=β0+β1BTD+β2PARTIAL_DELINK+β3DELINK+β4BTD×PARTIAL_DELINK+β5BTD×
DELINK+β6RIGHTS+β7BTD×RIGHTS+β8OWNER+β9AGE+β10LOSS+β11SIZE+β12B_SHARE+
β13LEVERAGE+βkINDUSTRY+ε

(2)

BTC_ADJ=γ0+γ1BTD+γ2PARTIAL_DELINK+γ3DELINK+γ4BTD×PARTIAL_DELINK+γ5BTD×
DELINK+γ6RIGHTS+γ7BTD×RIGHTS+γ8OWNER+γ9AGE+γ10LOSS+γ11SIZE+γ12B_SHARE+γ
13LEVERAGE+γkINDUSTRY+ε

(3)

where ADJ is the total tax audit adjustments deflated by sales revenue; BTD_ADJ the
book-tax-difference audit adjustments deflated by sales revenue; BTC_ADJ the
book-tax-conforming audit adjustments deflated by sales revenue; BTD the book-tax
difference, which equals pretax book income minus taxable income deflated by sales revenue;
PARTIAL_DELINK 1 if audit adjustments were made to a firm's taxable income during
1998–2000 (i.e., the moderate book-tax conformity period), 0 otherwise; DELINK 1 if audit
adjustments were made to a firm's taxable income during 2001–2003 (i.e., the low book-tax
conformity period), 0 otherwise; RIGHTS 1 if the firm applied for a rights issue in one of the
next 3 years, 0 otherwise; OWNER the percentage of shares owned by the government; AGE
the number of years the firm has been listed; LOSS 1 if the firm reported a loss, 0 otherwise;
SIZE the natural logarithm of total assets of the firm; B_SHARE 1 if the firm issued B shares,
0 otherwise; LEVERAGE the debt to equity ratio of the firm and INDUSTRY the industry
dummies (a set of eleven dummy variables).
Audit adjustments are tax deficiencies detected by the Chinese tax bureaus after a tax audit.
We deflate both the total tax audit adjustment (ADJ) and book-tax differences (BTD) by sales
revenue (before tax audit) because most of the adjustments and book-tax differences concern
revenues and expenses that are related to the level of a firm's activity. The deflation also
allows for cross-sectional comparison and reduces heteroskedasticity in the data. Consistent
with previous studies, we expect BTD to be positively associated with ADJ. The coefficient
α1 reflects the strength of BTD for ADJ in the pre-1998 period (i.e., the high book-tax
conformity period). If the magnitude of firms’ tax noncompliance increases as book-tax
conformity decreases, then the signs on PARTIAL_DELINK (the moderate book-tax
conformity period) and DELINK (the low book-tax conformity period) will be positive, and
the coefficient for DELINK will be greater than that for PARTIAL_DELINK (i.e., α3>α2>0).
As Hypothesis 1 also expects that the magnitude of book-tax-difference noncompliance
(BTD_ADJ) will increase as book-tax conformity decreases, the signs of β1, β2 and β3 should
be similar to those of α1, α2 and α3. In contrast, we expect no significant change in the
9

magnitude of book-tax-conforming noncompliance (BTC_ADJ) over the three periods (i.e.,
γ2=γ3=0).
We test Hypothesis 2 through the two interaction terms, BTD×PARTIAL_DELINK and
BTD×DELINK. The coefficients α4 and α5, respectively, measure the sensitivity of tax
audit adjustments to changes in BTD in the moderate and the low book-tax conformity period
as compared to the high-conformity period. Specifically, as we argue that BTD is a less
informative indicator of firms’ tax noncompliance (ADJ) when the level of book-tax
conformity decreases, we expect α1>(α1+α4)>(α1+α5) and hence the signs of α4 and α5 to be
negative. Further, we expect that the effect on the informativeness of BTD for tax
noncompliance will be most apparent for book-tax-difference noncompliance (BTD_ADJ).
4.3.

Control variables

We include nine control variables in the model. After going public, Chinese listed firms can
issue additional shares to their existing shareholders through rights offerings. To curb
excessive demand for rights offerings, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued
accounting-based guidelines to restrict rights issues after November 1993. In general, the
guidelines require Chinese listed companies to achieve a certain profitability level over the 3
years immediately preceding the year of application for a rights offering.4 This requirement
has led to rampant upward earnings management in China (Chen and Yuan, 2004). To
control for the special incentives to inflate book income, we use a dummy variable, RIGHTS,
which takes on the value of 1 if the firm applies for a rights offering in one of the next 3 years.
We predict that rights offering firms having high book incentives are less aggressive in tax
reporting than their counterparts, because they will incur higher contracting and capital
market costs by conforming book income to an aggressive tax position.5 Further, we include
an interaction variable, BTD×RIGHTS, to assess whether book-tax differences are more or
less informative for rights offering than non-rights offering firms.
In China, government entities are the controlling shareholders of many listed companies.
The tax incentives of government-controlled versus corporate-controlled firms vary. For
example, some managers of government-controlled firms view tax payment as part of their
civil obligations. However, most government-controlled firms also have important profit
motives, as they need to meet investors’ expectations. We include a continuous variable,
OWNER, which is the percentage of shares owned by the government, to control for this
possible effect. Another ownership factor is the presence of foreign investors in Chinese
listed companies, or B-Share firms (B_SHARE). The presence of foreign investors brings in
new management methods and better internal control systems that could reduce
noncompliance (Chan et al., 2006a).
Previous research has found conflicting evidence about the relationship between firm age and
4

China's regulation stipulates that a firm can apply for a rights issue only if its return on equity (ROE) reaches a
certain level in the 3 years immediately before the year of application. Over the years, the government has
modified the regulation to close certain loopholes while at the same time lowering the threshold to
compensate for the tightening of the rule. For example, the requirement in 1996 was a ROE≥10% in each of the
3 previous years. In 1999, the regulation changed to require a 3-year average ROE≥10% and a ROE≥6% for each
of the 3 previous years after listing. This requirement specifically excluded profits in the years before listing to
discourage earnings manipulation before an IPO. Starting in 2001, the requirement was a 3-year average
ROE≥6%. However, the 2001 regulation further tightened the requirement by excluding non-operating income
in the calculation of ROE as many firms with a low operating ROE used non-operating income to increase their
ROE to meet the requirement (Chen and Yuan, 2004).
5
We also consider two other variables that capture firms’ incentive to inflate book income. Firms with 2 years
of consecutive losses as well as firms that issued corporate bonds have special incentives to inflate book income
to avoid share delisting and violation of debt covenants, respectively. However, these variables are not
significant due to the small sample size and multicollinearity problem.
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financial distress. Some researchers maintain that young firms are more likely to experience
financial difficulties (Dopuch et al., 1987). Others argue that older firms are more likely
than younger firms to be susceptible to cash constraints over time after going public, and are
less compliant with tax regulations (Murray, 1995). To reflect these arguments, we employ a
continuous variable, AGE, as a proxy for incentives to boost cash flows over time, but make
no directional prediction regarding firm age because of the conflicting prior evidence. Mills
and Newberry (2001) suggest that loss firms have fewer tax-related incentives and thus tax
authorities audit them much less frequently in the US. However, Chinese tax authorities do
audit loss firms. In China, a loss firm must pay a tax penalty on any irregularity discovered.
For example, if tax authorities discover an understatement of revenue, the firm must pay a
33% tax penalty on the profit from the revenue understated, even though the firm is still in an
overall loss position (SAT, 1996). We employ a dummy variable, LOSS, to reflect this
notion, but make no directional prediction on this variable.
We use SIZE to control for any firm size and complexity effects. Although Hanlon et al.
(2007) find that firm size is positively associated with the level of tax noncompliance, Mills
(1998) fails to find such an effect. If large firms are more tax compliant because they are
politically visible to the regulators, then the coefficient will be negative. As the dependent
variable is scaled by sales, we use total assets (natural log form) as the measure of SIZE to
minimize the spurious bias to the estimated effect of scale that results from errors in
measuring the true scale variable (Hanlon et al., 2007). Further, we use LEVERAGE to
measure a firm's leverage level. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that firms subject to
greater monitoring by lenders are more likely to use income-increasing accounting procedures
to avoid violating debt covenants. Therefore, the higher the leverage, the higher will be the
non-tax cost of conforming book income to an aggressive tax position, and thus we expect a
negative relationship between LEVERAGE and tax noncompliance. INDUSTRY is a set of
dummy variables for each industry classification and controls for the possibility that variation
in industries is driving the audit adjustments.
4.4.

Sample selection bias

Because tax authorities do not audit every listed company, to the extent that audit adjustment
is conditional on the tax return being selected for audit, the inference about the effect of
book-tax differences on audit adjustment for the whole population could be biased. To
address the potential sample selection bias, we use the two-stage Heckman (1979) approach to
first estimate the probability of a firm being selected for audit with a probit regression as
follows.
AUDIT= ∂ 0+ ∂ 1BTD+ ∂ 2BTD_IND+ ∂ 3OWNER+ ∂ 4AGE+ ∂ 5LOSS+ ∂ 6SIZE+ ∂ 7CHANGE+ ∂
8MARGIN_IND+∂9B_SHARE+∂10LEVERAGE+∂kINDUSTRY+μ

(4)

where AUDIT is 1 if the firm was selected for tax audit, 0 otherwise; BTD_IND the
percentage of deviation of a firm's BTD from the industry average; CHANGE the percentage
change in the firm's annual book income and MARGIN_IND the ratio of the firm's profit
margin to the industry average. Other variables are as defined earlier.
We estimate Eq. (4) for each of the three book-tax conformity periods. The probit
regression produces consistent estimates for ∂, and these estimates are used to compute the
inverse Mills ratio, λ, for each period. In the second stage, we use OLS to estimate Eqs.
(1), (2) and (3) with the corresponding λ included as an additional variable to correct for
potential bias due to sample non-representation. Following the same sample selection
criteria described earlier, we obtained from the Chinese tax authorities 1834 firm-years that
were not subject to tax audits over the study period for probit regression analysis. These
firms had no audit adjustments.
5. Empirical results
11

5.1.

Descriptive statistics and univariate tests

Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the audited sample and univariate tests, comparing
the means of the variables in Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) over the three book-tax conformity levels.
Mean total audit adjustments (ADJ), which is 0.32% of sales revenue in the high book-tax
conformity period, increases to 0.49% in the moderate conformity period, and rises again to
0.52% in the low-conformity period. A similar pattern is observable for book-tax-difference
audit adjustments (BTD_ADJ). Mean book-tax differences (BTD) also show a similar trend,
increasing from 5.09% of sales revenue in the high-conformity period to 18.8% in the
low-conformity period. It is interesting to note that while we observe a significant increase
in BTD_ADJ over the three periods corresponding to the increase in BTD, there is no
significant change in book-tax-conforming audit adjustments (BTC_ADJ).
Table 1.

Descriptive statistics of the sample firms at different book-tax conformity levels.
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Panel A: One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the differences among the means
Pooled
(1996–
(1996–
2003)
(n=2941)
ADJ

Mean
(St. dev.)
BTD_ADJ Mean
(St. dev.)
BTC_ADJ Mean
(St. dev.)
BTD
Mean
(St. dev.)
RIGHTS
Mean
(St. dev.)
OWNER
Mean
(St. dev.)
AGE
Mean
(St. dev.)
LOSS
Mean
(St. dev.)
SIZE
Mean
(St. dev.)
B_SHARE Mean
(St. dev.)
LEVERAGE Mean
(St. dev.)

0.0046
(0.0079)
0.0039
(0.0075)
0.0007
(0.0035)
0.1222
(0.2923)
0.2618
(0.4397)
0.1866
(0.2372)
4.6970
(2.7325)
0.0584
(0.2347)
11.6014
(0.8680)
0.0806
(0.2722)
0.4388
(0.1831)

High
bookbook-tax
conformity
(1996–
(1996–
1997)
(n=710)
0.0032
(0.0047)
0.0024
(0.0045)
0.0007
(0.0021)
0.0509
(0.0609)
0.3732
(0.4840)
0.2185
(0.2500)
2.1944
(1.7740)
0.0423
(0.2013)
11.2087
(0.8641)
0.0986
(0.2983)
0.4294
(0.1564)

Moderate
bookbook-tax
conformity
(1998–
(1998–
2000)
(n=1286)
0.0049
(0.0078)
0.0043
(0.0077)
0.0007
(0.0014)
0.1134
(0.1371)
0.3390
(0.4736)
0.1872
(0.2359)
4.2519
(2.0075)
0.3578
(0.1858)
11.6061
(0.8023)
0.0793
(0.2703)
0.4209
(0.1642)

Low
bookbook-tax
stat.
F-stat.
conformity
(p-value)
(2001–
(2001–2003)
(n=945)
0.0052
(0.0096)
0.0045
(0.0089)
0.0008
(0.0056)
0.1880
(0.4791)
0.0731
(0.2603)
0.1618
(0.2263)
7.1831
(2.0588)
0.1016
(0.3023)
11.8866
(0.8462)
0.0794
(0.2705)
0.4702
(0.2188)

14.67
(0.000)a
18.05
(0.000)a
0.25
(0.783)
47.06
(0.000)a
142.21
(0.000)a
11.64
(0.000)a
1357.17
(0.000)a
24.03
(0.000)a
145.11
(0.000)a
1.31
(0.273)
21.24
(0.000)a

Panel B: Post hoc tests for the pairwise comparison of mean differences
High vs. moderate
High vs. low
Moderate vs. low
Mean diff. p-value
Mean diff. p-value
Mean diff. p-value
ADJ
−0.0017
0.000a
−0.0020
0.000a
−0.0003
0.390
a
a
BTD_ADJ
−0.0019
0.000
−0.0021
0.000
−0.0001
0.739
BTC_ADJ
−0.0001
0.858
−0.0001
0.727
−0.0000
0.782
BTD
−0.0625
0.000a
−0.1371
0.000a
−0.0746
0.000a
Notes: ADJ is total tax audit adjustment deflated by sales revenue. BTD_ADJ is book-tax-difference
audit adjustment deflated by sales revenue. BTC_ADJ is book-tax-conforming audit adjustment
deflated by sales revenue. BTD is pretax book income minus taxable income deflated by sales
revenue. RIGHTS is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm applied for rights offerings in one
of the next 3 years, and 0 otherwise. OWNER is the percentage of shares owned by the
government. AGE is the number of years the firm has been listed in the market. SIZE is the
natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm. B_share is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if
the firm issued B-shares, and 0 otherwise. leverage is the debt to equity ratio of the firm. LOSS is
an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm reported a loss, and 0 otherwise. Panel A reports the
means of all variables in the three book-tax conformity periods and the ANOVA on the differences
among the means. Panel B uses the least significant difference (LSD) test for the pairwise
comparison of mean differences.
a Denotes significance at the 5% level.
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The overall F-tests (reported in the last column of Panel A) on the test variables reject the null
hypothesis of equal means at the 5% level, except for BTC_ADJ. The multiple pairwise
comparison tests in Panel B indicate that the magnitudes of ADJ and BTD_ADJ increase as
book-tax conformity decreases. However, the increase is not statistically significant from
the moderate to the low-conformity period. There is also no significant increase in
BTC_ADJ over the three periods. In contrast, the magnitudes of BTD are significantly
different among the three periods.
An analysis of book-tax differences and audit adjustments in each period indicates that there
are clearly more sources of book-tax differences in the moderate and the low-conformity
periods than in the high-conformity period. Observed differences resulting in audit
adjustments common for all three periods include government subsidies and interest income
from government bonds, as explained earlier, as well as adjustments for expenses exceeding
tax deductible limits. The frequency of these audit adjustments increases as book and tax
incomes are delinked. These types of difference reflect a more extensive government
participation in the economy as compared with a mature Western economy such as the US.
In the later periods, more complicated book-tax differences are due to transactions being
reported differently for book and tax purposes. Examples include the use of different asset
useful lives, different lease accounting methods, sales cutoffs and revenue recognition criteria.
Most of the later period book-tax differences in our sample are similar to those found in US
studies. However, our data do not have the differences due to sophisticated transactions such
as off-balance-sheet financing using special purpose entities and debt–equity hybrid
instruments that Mills and Newberry (2005) mention.
5.2.

Multivariate tests

Table 2 shows the results of our stage-one estimation of the probit regression for each of the
three conformity periods. We find that BTD and the deviation of BTD from industry
average (BTD_IND) are the dominating factors affecting the audit selection in the
high-conformity period, but both become less statistically significant in the other two periods.
Specifically, the coefficient of BTD decreases from the high-conformity period to the
low-conformity period. BTD_IND also has a similar decreasing trend. This is consistent
with our argument in Hypothesis 2 that BTD becomes less informative of tax noncompliance
as book-tax conformity decreases. In contrast, other firm characteristics such as listing
history (AGE), profit margin relative to industry average (MARGIN_IND) and firm size
(SIZE) become more significant in the moderate and low-conformity periods. That is, in the
low-conformity period, the tax authorities appear to have focused on larger and older firms
because of their potential impact on tax revenue, and on lower margin profitable firms, but not
necessarily on loss firms as the LOSS variable is not significant.
Table 2.

Stage one: probit estimation of firms being selected for audit (N=4775).
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Probit equation:
AUDIT=∂0+∂1BTD+∂2BTD_IND+∂3OWNER+∂4AGE+∂5LOSS+∂6SIZE+∂7CHANGE+∂8MARGIN_IND+∂
9B_SHARE+∂10LEVERAGE+∂kINDUSTRY+μ
Expected
High conformity
Moderate conformity
Low conformity
Sign
Coeff.
p>|z|
Coeff.
p>|z|
Coeff.
p>|z|
Constant
1.3151
0.091
−1.6139
0.011
−3.6481
0.000
BTD
+
6.5678
0.000 a
1.8915
0.000 a
0.0052
0.970
a
a
BTD_IND
+
2.1101
0.000
1.6776
0.001
0.2016
0.184
OWNER
?
0.0281
0.885
−0.2744
0.052
−0.1859
0.208
AGE
?
−0.0252
0.378
0.2931
0.000 a
0.2593
0.000 a
LOSS
?
0.5722
0.084
0.2638
0.243
0.1827
0.164
SIZE
+
0.0302
0.067
0.0297
0.244
0.0982
0.000a
CHANGE
+
−0.0019
0.715
−0.0057
0.525
−0.0002
0.884
MARGIN_IND
−
−0.0023
0.950
−0.0167
0.432
−0.0898
0.001a
B_SHARE
−
−0.1442
0.341
−0.1417
0.324
−0.1945
0.138
LEVERAGE
?
0.2448
0.446
−0.2166
0.364
0.0054
0.976
INDUSTRY
?
Included, but not reported for brevity
% correctly
63.8%
61.5%
62.6%
classified
Notes: This table shows the results of the first-stage probit regression estimating the probability of a firm being
selected for tax audit at the three conformity levels. The dependent variable, AUDIT, is an indicator variable set
equal to 1 if a firm is selected for tax audit, and 0 otherwise. BTD_IND is the percentage deviation of the firm's
book-tax difference from the industry mean. CHANGE is the percentage change in firm's annual book income.
MARGIN_IND is the ratio of the firm's profit margin to the industry average. INDUSTRY is a set of eleven
dummy variables representing different industries. All other variables are defined in Table 1.
a
Denotes significance at the 5% level.

Table 3 shows the stage-two estimation results of pooled, cross-sectional regressions.6 Panel
A presents the results for total audit adjustments (ADJ), while Panels B and C, respectively,
present the results for book-tax-difference audit adjustments (BTD_ADJ) and
book-tax-conforming audit adjustments (BTC_ADJ).
All three models explain the
cross-sectional variations in audit adjustments significantly. It appears that λ contributes
little to the explanatory power of the models.
Table 3. Stage two: audit adjustment regressions (N=2941).

6

To correct for heteroskedasticity, we estimated the errors using White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
procedure. We found no heteroskedasticity in the data. We also used a random coefficient regression model
that does not assume constant residuals and obtained similar results as our original OLS regression. Further, all
variance inflation factors are small (below 5.135) and all of the correlations among the independent variables
are below 0.728. These results indicate no significant multicollinearity problem.
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ADJ=α0+α1BTD+α2PARTIAL_DELINK+α3DELINK+α4BTDxPARTIAL_DELINK+α5BTD×DELINK+α6
RIGHTS+α7BTD×RIGHTS+α8OWNER+α9AGE+α10LOSS+α11SIZE+α12B_SHARE+α13LEVERAGE+αk
INDUSTRY+ε

Constant
BTD
PARTIAL_DELINK
DELINK
BTD×PARTIAL_DELINK
BTD×DELINK
RIGHTS
BTD×RIGHTS
OWNER
AGE
LOSS
SIZE
B_SHARE
LEVERAGE
Λ
INDUSTRY

Exp.

(Panel A) ADJ

Sign

Coeff.

+
+
+
−
−
−
−
?
?
?
−
−
−
?
?

p-value

(Panel B)
BTD_ADJ
Coeff.

p-value

(Panel C)
BTC_ADJ
Coeff.

p-value

0.0318
0.000 0.0262
0.000 0.0102
0.000
a
a
0.0142 0.002
0.0160 0.000
0.0016
0.442
a
a
0.0027 0.000
0.0029 0.000
0.0003
0.110
a
a
0.0039 0.000
0.0035 0.000
0.0004
0.101
a
−0.0074
0.120 −0.0111 0.017 −0.0012
0.567
a
a
−0.0105 0.022 −0.0133 0.003 −0.0009
0.661
a
a
−0.0011 0.002 −0.0012 0.001
0.0001
0.821
a
a
−0.0042 0.000 −0.0034 0.001 −0.0005
0.311
a
a
0.0014 0.016
0.0012 0.041
0.0005
0.083
−0.0001
0.397 0.0001
0.459 −0.0001
0.074
−0.0001
0.826 −0.0002
0.766 0.0000
0.865
a
a
a
−0.0024 0.000 −0.0022 0.000 −0.0004 0.000
0.0005
0.337 0.0000
0.963 0.0001
0.686
a
a
−0.0025 0.002 −0.0019 0.014 −0.0007
0.055
−0.0006
0.182 −0.0009
0.060 0.0001
0.690
Included, but not reported for brevity
F=20.44 (p=0.000) F=17.46 (p=0.000) F=5.74 (p=0.000)
Adj. R2=14.2%
Adj. R2=12.3%
Adj. R2=3.9%

Notes: This table shows the stage-two estimation results of the impact of book-tax differences on tax
noncompliance at the three conformity levels. The dependent variables are total audit adjustment (ADJ),
book-tax-difference audit adjustment (BTD_ADJ) and book-tax-conforming audit adjustment (BTC_ADJ) as
defined in Table 1. PARTIAL_DELINK is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if audit adjustments were made to
a firm's taxable income during 1998–2000 (the moderate conformity period), and 0 otherwise. DELINK is an
indicator variable set equal to 1 if audit adjustments were made to a firm's taxable income during 2001–2003
(the low-conformity period), and 0 otherwise. λ is the inverse Mills ratio. All other variables are defined in
Table 1.
a
Denotes significance at the 5% level.

As expected in Hypothesis 1, PARTIAL_DELINK and DELINK are significant with a
positive coefficient for both the ADJ and the BTD_ADJ models, which suggest that tax
noncompliance in the moderate or low-conformity period is significantly larger than that in
the high-conformity period. Furthermore, a Wald test indicates that the coefficient for
DELINK is significantly larger (at the 5% level) than that for PARTIAL_DELINK, which
suggests that the magnitude of tax noncompliance increases as book-tax conformity
decreases.
For the two conformity period interaction terms in the ADJ model (Panel A), the coefficient is
negatively
significant
for
BTD×DELINK,
but
is
not
significant
for
BTD×PARTIAL_DELINK. Thus, we have evidence that the informativeness of book-tax
differences for tax noncompliance decreases significantly in the low book-tax conformity
period. For the BTD_ADJ model (Panel B), the relationship between BTD and tax
noncompliance is clearer. The coefficients on both interaction terms are significant at the 5%
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level, and they are clearly more significant than the corresponding coefficients in Panel A.
Moreover, the coefficient for BTD in Panel B, which is 0.0160 (β1) for the high-conformity
period, decreases to 0.0049 (i.e., β1+β4) for the moderate conformity period, and declines
again to 0.0027 (i.e., β1+β5) for the low-conformity period. The Wald tests on these
coefficients show that β1>(β1+β4)>(β1+β5)>0. These results indicate that BTD has a
significant impact on book-tax-difference noncompliance in all three periods, but the impact
declines substantially in the lower conformity periods.
Panel C presents a rather different pattern for book-tax-conforming noncompliance
(BTC_ADJ). None of the test variables are statistically significant. It is noteworthy that in
both the univariate and multivariate tests, BTC_ADJ does not change in any significant way
over the three book-tax conformity periods. Hence, it is useful to separate
book-tax-conforming noncompliance from book-tax-difference noncompliance as they do
exhibit very different forms of behavior. This separation allows us to observe a clearer
association between book-tax differences and tax noncompliance. These results also
strengthen our argument that there is no time series effect (e.g., an increase in audit expertise
or effort) on audit adjustment over the three time periods. If there was such an effect, we
would have observed an increase in both types of audit adjustment.
For the control variables, we find that rights offering firms have significantly less total audit
adjustments and book-tax-difference audit adjustments than non-rights offering firms (Panels
A and B). These results suggest that rights offering firms, because of their need to meet
minimum profitability requirements and because they cannot costlessly increase book-tax
differences, are less likely than their counterparts to be aggressive in both tax and financial
reporting. This is consistent with Erickson et al. (2004) and Mills and Newberry (2001) that
managers may be willing to forfeit tax dollars by increasing book income in ways that also
increase taxable income. The coefficients of the interaction term, BTD×RIGHTS, in Panels A
and B are negatively significant suggesting that book-tax differences are more informative of
tax noncompliance for non-rights offering firms than for rights offering firms. As non-rights
offering firms have less book incentives for earnings management than rights offering firms,
our results are parallel with Mills (1998, Table 2) that book-tax differences are more
informative of tax noncompliance for private firms than for public firms. Similar to the rights
offering firms, highly geared firms are subject to a higher non-tax cost of understating book
income, and thus they are less likely to be noncompliant by reporting both lower taxable
income and lower book income. Further, we find that firms with higher percentages of state
ownership are less compliant in the ADJ and the BTD_ADJ models. Relative to small firms,
large firms are more tax compliant because of the political costs they face for noncompliance.
It is also possible that large firms are better able to have their tax-avoiding strategies go
undetected because they have more resources to do so (Mills, 1998). For sub-industry effects
(not tabled), we find that companies in the manufacturing and real estate industries have more
audit adjustments than companies in other industries.
In summary, the magnitude of tax noncompliance increases as book-tax conformity decreases.
While the association between tax audit adjustments and book-tax differences is significantly
positive at all conformity levels, our results demonstrate that those differences become less
informative of tax noncompliance as the link between book income and taxable income
loosens. This suggests that the noise created by having more legitimate differences and
earnings management in the moderate and the low-conformity periods dilutes the
informativeness of book-tax differences for tax noncompliance. The declining importance of
book-tax differences in the audit selection process as shown in Table 2 provides corroborating
evidence for this finding.
5.3. Robustness tests
To check the robustness of the regression results, we performed the following sets of
secondary tests. First, as a firm's use of aggressive tax position could affect both
book-tax-difference and book-tax-conforming audit adjustments, our regression equations for
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BTD_ADJ and BTC_ADJ could be interdependent. We reran the data using a system of
equations approach, Seemingly Unrelated Regression, to account for any possible
contemporaneous correlation in the error terms of the two equations. Our results indicate that
there was no change in the significance of the test variables as shown in Table 3.
Second, to reduce the potential understated standard errors in a pooled, cross-sectional
regression, we ran by-period regressions for each of the three levels of book-tax conformity as
presented in Table 4. For both the ADJ (Panel A) and the BTD_ADJ models (Panel B), the
coefficients on BTD show a general declining trend. In addition, the significantly negative
coefficients for BTD×RIGHTS in the low-conformity period suggests that book-tax
differences are more informative of tax noncompliance for non-rights offering firms than
rights offering firms, consistent with the overall results in Table 3. Further, it appears that the
significantly negative coefficients on RIGHTS and LEVERAGE (Panels A and B) are most
evident in the low-conformity period. This suggests that rights offering and highly leveraged
firms have significantly less tax noncompliance than their counterparts in the low-conformity
period due to higher non-tax costs.
Table 4. Stage two: audit adjustment regressions at different book-tax conformity levels.
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Exp. sign
Panel A: ADJ
Constant
BTD
RIGHTS
BTD×RIGHTS
OWNER
AGE
LOSS
SIZE
B_SHARE
LEVERAGE

λ

INDUSTRY

Panel B: BTD_ADJ
Constant
BTD
RIGHTS
BTD×RIGHTS
OWNER
AGE
LOSS
SIZE
B_SHARE
LEVERAGE

λ

INDUSTRY

Panel C: BTC_ADJ
Constant
BTD
RIGHTS
BTD×RIGHTS
OWNER
AGE
LOSS
SIZE
B_SHARE
LEVERAGE

High conformity
Coeff.
p-value

Moderate conformity
Coeff.
p-value

Low conformity
Coeff.
p-value

?
+
−
−
?
?
?
−
−
−
?
?

0.0125
0.000
0.0395
0.000
0.0481
0.000
a
a
0.0146
0.000
0.0070
0.000
0.0033
0.000a
a
0.0003
0.491 −0.0013
0.045
−0.0023
0.049a
−0.0089
0.124 −0.0069
0.060
−0.0030
0.031a
0.0009
0.238
0.0010
0.262
0.0025
0.059
−0.0000
0.883
0.0001
0.486
−0.0003
0.031a
−0.0001
0.957
0.0001
0.954
0.0001
0.923
−0.0008
0.001a −0.0028
0.000a
−0.0032
0.000a
0.0002
0.750
0.0001
0.855
0.0007
0.565
−0.0019
0.114 −0.0017
0.215
−0.0036
0.013a
0.0004
0.498 −0.0012
0.090
−0.0007
0.498
Included, but not reported for brevity
F=3.20 (p=0.000)
F=11.49 (p=0.000) F=10.02 (p=0.000)
Adj. R2=6.1%
Adj. R2=14.6%
Adj. R2=16.7%

?
+
−
−
?
?
?
−
−
−
?
?

0.0130
0.000
0.0334
0.000
0.0375
a
a
0.0123
0.001
0.0051
0.003
0.0025
−0.0002
0.605 −0.0014
0.027a
−0.0022
−0.0006
0.900 −0.0054
0.144
−0.0024
0.0001
0.884
0.0009
0.305
0.0024
0.0003
0.007a
0.0002
0.215
−0.0002
−0.0011
0.184
0.0001
0.981
0.0002
−0.0009
0.000a −0.0024
0.000a
−0.0029
0.0002
0.721
0.0001
0.904
0.0002
−0.0007
0.538 −0.0017
0.239
−0.0029
−0.0012
0.330 −0.0013
0.081
−0.0005
Included, but not reported for brevity
F=4.67 (p=0.000)
F=8.87 (p=0.000)
F=8.31 (p=0.000)
Adj. R2=9.8%
Adj. R2=11.40%
Adj. R2=13.4%

0.000
0.001a
0.050a
0.062
0.056
0.132
0.984
0.000a
0.868
0.034a
0.574

?
+
−
−
?
?
?
−
−
−
?
?

0.0062
0.000
0.0062
0.000
0.0213
0.000
0.0019
0.270
0.0002
0.580
0.0006
0.200
0.0004
0.532 −0.0002
0.082
0.0001
0.928
−0.0009
0.959
0.0008
0.244
−0.0004
0.654
0.0003
0.421 −0.0001
0.563
0.0013
0.103
−0.0000
0.625 −0.0000
0.074
−0.0001
0.346
−0.0002
0.561
0.0001
0.644
−0.0000
0.996
−0.0005
0.000a −0.0004
0.000a
−0.0006
0.008a
−0.0001
0.802
0.0000
0.902
0.0003
0.690
−0.0007
0.190 −0.0001
0.600
−0.0012
0.190
λ
0.0003
0.568
0.0003
0.391
−0.0005
0.426
INDUSTRY
Included, but not reported for brevity
F=3.15 (p=0.000)
F=5.52 (p=0.000)
F=4.40 (p=0.000)
Adj. R2=6.0%
Adj. R2=6.9%
Adj. R2=7.0%
Notes: All variables are as defined in Table 1 and Table 3.
a
Denotes significance at the 5% level.

Third, we excluded 1998 and 2001 because they were transitional years during which China
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implemented new accounting regulations. We also tested our results with another reduced
population by treating the partial delinking period (1998–2000) as transitional and examined
only the top (2001–2003) and the bottom (1996–1997) observations. Our main results are not
sensitive to using these reduced populations. Fourth, we replicated Table 3 by scaling audit
adjustments and BTD by total assets and using sales revenue as the measure of SIZE. The
main results are invariant to using this alternative scaling. Fifth, we added back 172
firm-years with negative or zero audit adjustments (about 5% of the sample) into our main
sample. Replication of Table 3 indicates that our conclusions remain qualitatively the same as
the original results. Sixth, we replicated the analysis reported in Table 3 for the sample with
negative or zero book-tax differences (13% of the total sample distributed roughly equally
over the three periods) and, in line with Mills (1998), we found no statistically significant
relationship between BTD and the magnitude of audit adjustments. As Mills (1998) explained,
negative book-tax differences are often the result of large, infrequent expenses that are not tax
deductible and are thus unrelated to the magnitude of adjustments.
Finally, we compared the audit adjustments across years within the same book-tax conformity
period to ascertain whether there was any time series effect. Our multivariate results indicate
that audit adjustments are not significantly different from year to year within each of the three
periods, but they are different across different periods. These results provide assurance that
changes in audit adjustments are mainly due to changes in the propensity of managers to
engage in opportunistic reporting behavior. Corresponding to this finding, we also checked
the within-firm changes in BTD for firms that had been audited across all the sample years
(47 firms). We found that the changes in BTD within a period are significantly smaller than
the changes across different periods.7 These results further strengthen our argument that
changes in audit adjustments and book-tax differences are due mainly to changes in
regulations rather than a time series effect.
6. Conclusions
Many countries are moving away from tax-based accounting systems in the hope of
improving the usefulness and value relevance of financial reports. In this study, we investigate
whether that move is likely to engender tax noncompliance and how well book-tax differences
can continue to signal tax noncompliance. Aligning tax and book income will force firms to
make the book-tax tradeoff, constraining the extent to which firms engage in tax
noncompliance behavior. In contrast, detaching book income from taxable income will
decrease the need for the tradeoff, thus creating more opportunities for firms to manage
taxable income with less effect on book income. Furthermore, when book income conforms to
taxable income, book-tax differences should generally be small, and any material shortage of
taxable income below book income probably represents tax noncompliance. However, when
book income departs from taxable income, book-tax differences are the result of intrinsic
differences in the rules for financial reporting and tax reporting, and extrinsic differences in
managerial intent. Thus, we expect that book-tax differences will be a less useful indicator of
tax noncompliance when financial reporting is delinked from tax reporting. Based on a
distinct set of listed firms that experienced a shift in the level of book-tax conformity in China,
we provide evidence that as the level of book-tax conformity decreases, tax noncompliance
increases and book-tax differences become less predictive of tax aggressiveness.
Our study contributes to the book-tax tradeoff literature in a number of ways. First, we extend
the applicability and validate the robustness of the book-tax tradeoff theory using a setting
(departure from tax-based accounting) not available in the US but highly relevant for many
7

While the average percentage changes in BTD within each of the three periods are 12% in the
high-conformity period (1996–1997), 21% in the moderate-conformity period (1998–2000) and 65% in the
low-conformity periods (2001–2003), the changes in BTD across different periods are 164% from the high to the
moderate period (i.e., from 1997 to 1998) and 179% from the moderate to the low-conformity period (i.e., from
2000 to 2001).
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transition economies. Second, we empirically verify the impact of a change in the book-tax
conformity level on the change in the magnitude of tax noncompliance and the type of
noncompliance affected. Third, we enrich the book-tax tradeoff theory by linking the change
in the need for a tradeoff with the change in the informativeness of book-tax differences for
tax noncompliance, and the change in their importance for tax audit selection. Fourth, our
study provides evidence of how firms with special incentives to inflate book earnings tradeoff
current tax savings against financial reporting incentives and expected tax examination costs
at three different book-tax conformity levels.
Finally, the study sheds light on the recurring debate about the perceived benefits and costs of
conforming book and taxable income. Previous studies have generally examined the costs of
book-tax conformity for capital markets. The belief that this conformity would mitigate
corporate tax avoidance is based largely on perception. Our study fills this gap in the literature
by providing archival evidence that conforming book-tax incomes are indeed less costly from
a tax perspective. Thus, our study provides support for the proponents of book-tax conformity
in the US. Our results show that narrowing the book-tax difference gap can reduce the
opportunities and incentives for tax noncompliance.
Our findings also have public policy implications for other countries, especially transition
economies contemplating a change in the book-tax relationship. One implication is that
policymakers should consider not only the positive effect of relaxing tax-based accounting
principles on the quality of financial reports, but also the negative impact of this relaxation on
tax law compliance. Countries that decouple their financial and tax reporting systems should
proactively increase their tax enforcement efforts. To facilitate tax enforcement, we
recommend that listed firms be required to disclose more information about the sources and
magnitude of significant book-tax differences in their tax returns. This disclosure requirement
should improve the transparency of a firm's tax activities and provide up front, before an audit,
an important source of supplemental information from which the government can then
determine whether to pursue an audit.
Appendix.
See Table A1.
Table A1. Common book-tax differences (BTD) per relevant accounting and tax regulations
before and after the departure from tax-based accounting.
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Accounting item

Under taxtax-based accounting
BTD
BookBook-tax treatments

BTD

1. Useful life of fixed
No
assets

Same useful lives for book
and tax purposes.

2. Salvage value of
No
fixed assets

Same salvage value (5% of
original cost) for book and tax Yes
purposes.

3. Depreciation
method

No

Same method (usually
straight line method,
Yes
accelerated methods allowed
for certain plant assets).

4. Inventory
valuation

No

Based on historical cost and
the same inventory costing
Yes
method for book and tax
purposes.

5. Bad debt
provision

No

6. Intangible assets No

Yes

Provision ranges from 0.3% to
0.5% of accounts receivable Yes
for book and tax purposes.
Historical cost and amortize
over the contract period or 10
years (not more than 10 years
Yes
for book, but at least 10 years
for tax, thus in practice 10
years). a

7. Organization
costs

No

Amortize over 5 years for
book and tax purposes.

8. Short-term and
long-term
investments

No

Historical cost and no
unrealized gain/loss for book Yes
and tax purposes.

9. Interest income
from government
Yes
bonds
10. Revenue from
transfer of
Yes
technologies
11. Donations/
income received for
environmental
Yes
protection and
charitable projects

Yes

After adoption of IAS/IFRS
BookBook-tax treatments
Different useful lives for book and
tax purposes (e.g., a longer useful
life for book).
Different salvage values for book
and tax (e.g., 5% for tax, but more
than 5% of the original cost for
book).
Different depreciation methods for
book and tax purposes (e.g.,
straight line method for book, but
accelerated method for tax for
certain plant assets).
Lower of cost or market for book
only. Different inventory costing
methods for book and tax
purposes (e.g., FIFO for book and
average method for tax).
No restriction on provision for
book, but up to 0.5% of accounts
receivable balance for tax purpose.
Revalue or amortize over not more
than 10 years depending on asset
useful life for book, but amortize
over at least 10 years for tax
purpose.
Amortize over not more than 5
years for book, but at least 5 years
for tax purposes.a
Lower of cost or market for book
purpose and unrealized gain/loss
recognized for book, but not for tax
purpose.

Interest income recognized
for book but exempted for tax Yes
purpose.

Same as tax-based accounting.

Revenue recognized for book
Yes
but exempted for tax purpose.

Same as tax-based accounting.

Donations/income recognized
as income for book purpose Yes
but exempted for tax purpose.

Same as tax-based accounting.

Subsidies recognized as
income for book purpose but
exempted for tax purpose if
Same as tax-based accounting.
12. Government
Yes/No the subsidies relate to food, Yes/No However, specific tax exemptions
subsidies
high-tech R&D and other
change over time.
allowed items as per relevant
regulations.
a
The difference in accounting and tax regulations indicates that the Chinese tax authorities do recognize the
potential of firms overstating book income and understating taxable income.
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